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Abstract 
A logic is defined that allows to express in­
formation about statistical probabilities and 
about degrees of belief in specific proposi­
tions. By interpreting the two types of proba­
bilities in one common probability space, the 
semantics given are well suited to model the 
influence of statistical information on the for­
mation of subjective beliefs. Cross entropy 
minimization is a key element in these se­
mantics, the use of which is justified by show­
ing that the resulting logic exhibits some very 
reasonable properties. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
It has often been noted that "probability" is a term 
with dual use: it can be applied to the frequency of 
occurrence of a specific property in a large sample of 
objects, and to the degree of belief granted to a propo­
sition. 
While some have argued that only one of these two in­
terpretations captures the true meaning of probability 
[Jay78], others have tried to analyze both usages of the 
term in their own right, and to clarify the relationship 
between the two aspects of probability. 
Carnap was among the first to do this ([Car50]). Even 
though his interest lies primarily with probabilities as 
subjective beliefs (or "degrees of confirmation"), he 
also formulates direct (inductive) inference as a prin­
ciple to arrive at subjective beliefs on the basis of given 
relative frequencies: when it is known that objects 
from a class cl also are members of a class c2 with a 
frequency p, and a specific object a is believed to be­
long to cl' then the given statistical information may 
be used as a justification for assigning p as a degree of 
belief to a's belonging to c2. 
When, instead of firmly believing that a is an element 
of C1, one only has several conflicting pieces of evi­
dence about the true nature of a, these can be com­
bined to form a degree of belief for a being in c2 by 
using Jeffrey's rule [Jef65], as illustrated in the follow­
ing example. 
Example 1.1 Scanning channels on TV we have 
tuned in to a mystery film. It looks interesting, but we 
only want to continue watching it, if a happy ending 
seems likely. 
By what we have seen so far, we judge the film to be ei­
ther American, French, or English, with a likelihood of 
0.2, 0.6, and 0.2 respectively. From our extensive past 
experience with mystery films we know that 8 out of 10 
American films have a happy end, while this figure is 
1 and 5 out of 10 for French and English productions, 
respectively. 
Jeffrey's rule in this situation states, that our degree 
of belief in a happy ending of the film we are currently 
watching should be given by 
0.2 X 0.8 + 0.6 X 0.1 + 0.2 X 0.5 = 0.32. (1) 
Hence, we better switch channels. 
It must be noted at this place that calling the infer­
ence in this example by the name of Jeffrey's rule is a 
somewhat loose terminology: when Jeffrey originally 
stated his rule he was concerned with updating prior 
subjective beliefs to posterior subjective beliefs in the 
light of newly obtained evidence, not with using statis­
tical information to define degrees of belief. Hence, the 
terms for the conditional probabilities of a happy end 
given the origin of a film that appear in (1) would be 
some prior conditional beliefs in Jeffrey's rule, rather 
than statistical expressions. If, however, the funda­
mental assumption is made that in the absence of any 
specific information about an object, the subjective be­
liefs held about the object are governed by the statis­
tical information available for the domain from which 
it is taken, then conditional belief and conditional sta­
tistical probability can be equated, and the rule for 
deriving degrees of belief from statistical information 
exemplified by (1) be identified with Jeffrey's rule. 
Note, too, that this assumption also underlies the di­
rect inference principle, which from this perspective 
then can be seen as a special case of Jeffrey's rule 
- special both in the way prior beliefs are defined 
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through relative frequencies and in that the new ev­
idence concerning the nature of an object takes the 
form of one certain fact. 
The kind of probabilistic inference illustrated in exam­
ple 1.1 might be called default reasoning about prob­
abilities. While this should be clearly distinguished 
from logical default reasoning (e.g. [McC80], [Rei80]), 
it shares the nonmonotinicity of these logics: in the 
light of additional (probabilistic or definite) informa­
tion, earlier inferences may be retracted. 
Recently, proposals have been made to incorporate the 
two kinds of probabilistic statements in an extension 
of first-order predicate logic [Ha190], [Bac90J. Here, 
statistical information and subjective beliefs are mod­
elled by probability measures on the domains of first­
order structures and sets of possible worlds, respec­
tively. While this is an intuitively appealing interpre­
tation of the formulas, it does not allow for the kind 
of reasoning exemplified by Jeffrey's rule. The proba­
bility measures on the domain and the possible worlds 
can be chosen independently in such a way that all 
the formulas in the given knowledge base are satisfied, 
but no interaction between the two kinds of proba­
bilistic statements takes place. Indeed, Halpern writes 
[Hal90]: "Although 2'3 ( «P) [the combined probabilistic 
logic in question] allows arbitrary alternation of the 
two types of probability, the semantics does support 
the intuition that these really are two fundamentally 
different types of probability." 
An additional strategy to arrive at subjective be­
liefs on the basis of statistical information is devel­
oped in [Bac91], [GHK92a], [GHK92b], [BGHK92], 
and [BGHK93]. This strategy, which is based on di­
rect inference, has the great disadvantage that it does 
not allow for any given subjective beliefs to be used 
for arriving at new degrees of belief. Hence, even Jef­
frey's rule is beyond the scope of reasoning that can 
be carried out in this framework. On the other hand, 
very specific degrees of belief are assigned to propo­
sitions even in the absence of any information: on 
the basis of an empty knowledge base, the proposi­
tions American(this-film) and American(this-film)l\ 
Happy_end(this-film) would be assigned a degree of 
belief of 0.5 and 0.25 respectively. 
The formalism presented in this paper, though mo­
tivated by similar intuitions as the above mentioned, 
exhibits rather different properties. Among them are: 
• The expressive power of the language used is 
smaller than in [Hal90], [Bac90]. Notably, expres­
sions about statistical and subjective probabilities 
can only be combined in a restricted way. 
• Both statistical and subjective probabilities can 
be specified in a knowledge base, and new proba­
bilities of both types be inferred. While the statis­
tical probabilities entailed by the knowledge base 
essentially depend on the given statistical infor­
mation only, the resulting subjective beliefs de-
pend crucially on both types of probabilistic state­
ments. 
• When only partial statistical information is avail­
able (as is usually the case), no default assump­
tions about the statistical probabilities are made. 
As a result, it will usually only be possible to infer 
probability intervals rather than unique probabil­
ity values from a knowledge base 
The basic idea on which the formalism to be de­
fined in the following sections is based, is to inter­
pret both types of probabilistic expressions by prob­
ability measures on a common probability space. 
In the example above it is noticeable that both 
the statements about the relative frequency for 
happy endings and the subjective assignment of 
likelihood to the predicates American, French and 
English, are basically constraints on a probabil­
ity measure on the formulas in the vocabulary 
S::;: {American, French, English, Happy_end}, where in 
some cases a constant "this_film" enters as a param­
eter. When deductions from the knowledge base are 
made, it is again probabilities on these formulas that 
are to be inferred. Default reasoning about probabil­
ities can now be viewed as the process of selecting a 
probability measure on the expressions this-film E ¢> 
(with if; E Ls, i.e. a first-order formula over S) that 
most closely resembles the probability measure gener­
ally assigned to Ls on the basis of the given statistical 
information. 
While it would be desirable, to work with probability 
measures on the abstract syntactic structure Ls itself 
(as has been done for terminological logics in [Jae94]), 
it proves much easier, in the more general framework 
of first-order predicate logic, to use probability mea­
sures on the domain of an interpretation to induce a 
probability measure on Ls. 
2 SYNTAX 
As mentioned above, it will not be possible to freely 
combine expressions about the two different lcinds of 
probabilities. Hence, two distinct extensions of the 
syntax of first-order logic have to be provided. 
The following notational conventions will be used in 
the sequel: tuples (vo, . . . , Vn- d , (ao, . . . , ak-d of 
variable or constant symbols are abbreviated by v, a. 
When it is necessary to explicitly note the length of 
a tuple, the notation �' � may be used. ¢>(v) is used 
to denote a formula ¢> whose free variables are among 
Vo, ... ,Vn-1· 
Definition 2.1 Let S be a vocabulary containing 
relation-, function-, and constant-symbols. A statis­
tical formula in S is any formula that can be con­
structed from S by the syntax rules of first-order pred­
icate logic with equality together with the new rule: 
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• If ¢( v) and 1/;( v) are statistical formulas in S, 
{Vi1, ... ,vik} � {vo, ... ,v,_I} , and p E [0 , 1], 
then 
[¢(v) 11/J(v)] k 2:: p 
(v&) 
is a statistical formula in S. The free variables 
in this formula are the free variables of ¢ and 1/J 
without { Vi1, • • •  , Vik}. 
The set of statistical formulas in S is denoted by LS'. A 
statistical formula with no free variables is a statistical 
sentence. 
Definition 2.2 Let s be as above, and { ao, ... , an-I} 
a set of constant symbols not in S. A subjective prob­
ability sentence for a in S is any sentence of the form 
prob(¢[a]I1/J[a]) 2:: p 
with ¢(v), 1/;(v) E 15, and p E [0, 1]. L�(a) denotes the 
set of all these sentences. 
The abbreviations [¢ 11/J](...) :::; p and prob(¢ 11/1) :::; p 
may be used for [...,¢ 11/Jk .. J 2:: 1- p and prob(...,¢ I 
1/J) 2:: 1 - p respectively. 
Similarly, [¢ I 1/Jk .. J = p, [¢ I 1/Jk .. J < p and [¢ I 
1/;](. .. ) > pare defined. Also, prob(¢ 11/J) = p may be 
substituted for the pair of sentences prob( ¢ I 1/J) 2:: p 
and prob( ¢ I 'ljJ) :::; p. Note, however, that prob( ¢ I 
'ljJ) < p would have to be defined by means of the 
negation of prob( ¢ I 'ljJ) 2:: p, and such a negation is 
not within the syntax given by definition 2.2. Finally, 
[¢]c .. ) 2:: p and prob(¢) 2:: pare used for [¢I -r]( ... ) 2:: p 
and prob(¢ I -r) 2:: p, where Tis any tautology. 
Definition 2. 1 is standard and can be found similarly 
in [Kei85], [Hal90], [Bac90]. Definition 2.2 differs from 
its counterparts in [Hal90] and [Bac90] in that prob(¢ I 
1/J) 2:: p is seen as a statement about a distinguished 
subset of the constant symbols appearing in ¢ and '1/J, 
and ¢, 'ljJ are not allowed to contain, in turn, a formula 
of the form prob(¢' I '1/J') 2:: p'. 
A knowledge base KB in the language here defined con­
sists of a finite set �o- of statistical sentences (which 
will typically also contain some purely first-order sen­
tences), and a finite set �,6(a) of subjective probability 
sentences for a. 
Example 2.3 The probabilistic knowledge from our 
introductory example can be �mbolized by a knowl­
edge base KB /I = �Movies U � (II) where /1 is a con­
stant symbol standing for the unknown film we are 
concerned with, and 
�Movies= 
[Happy_endv I Americanv 1\ Mysteryv](v) = 0.8 (2) 
[Happy_endv I Englishv 1\ Mysteryv](v) = 0.5 (3) 
[Happy_endv I Frenchv 1\ Mysteryv](u) = 0.1 (4) 
�,6(!1) := 
prob(Americanf1/\ Mysteryf1) = 0.2 
prob(Englishj1/\ Mysteryj1) = 0.2 
prob(Frenchj1 /\ Mysteryj1) = 0.6 
3 SEMANTICS 
3.1 OUTLINE 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
A semantical structure in which �o- can be interpreted 
is defined along the same lines as in [Kei85], [Hal90], 
[Bac90]: 
Definition 3.1 A statistical $-structure is a structure 
(M, I), where 
• M = (M, !J.Jt, Jl) is a probability space with do­
main M, supplied with a cr-algebra !JJt and a prob­
ability measure Jl on !J.Jt. 
• I is an interpretation function that maps the 
relation-, function-, and constant-symbols in S to 
relations, functions and elements of M in such a 
way that for every formula ¢( v) E 15, the inter­
pretation I(¢) � M"' is measurable with respect 
to the product cr-algebra !J.Jt"'. 
The condition imposed on I in this definition may seem 
highly restrictive; in fact, one may wonder whether 
statistical structures in the sense of definition 3.1 ac­
tually exist. While it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to embark on a thorough measure-theoretic discussion 
of the questions here involved, it should be pointed 
out, that whenever M is finite or countably infinite, 
then !JJt can be taken to be the power set 2M, and 
every subset of M"' is measurable with respect to !J.Jt"'. 
What about an interpretation for �,6(a)? As was indi­
cated in the introduction, subjective probability sen­
tences can be seen as making assertions about a prob­
ability measure on the formulas in the vocabulary S, 
with a just a name or parameter for this measure. Put 
another way, in the context of a fixed structure ( M ,I), 
a in this interpretation may be viewed as a random 
variable with values in Mn, and �,a(a) is a set of con­
straints on its distribution. Since these constraints 
only concern subsets of Mn that are definable by for­
mulas in 15, which, by definition 3.1, all belong to !J.Jtn, 
this leads to the following definition. 
Definition 3.2 A probabilistic S-structure for a is a 
structure 
(M, I, va), 
where (M, I) is a statistical $-structure, and va is a 
probability measure on !JJt"' . 
Some conditions are immediate for when a probabilis­
tic S-structure shall be called a model of a knowledge 
base KB = �o- u �,a(a): for a statistical $-structure 
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(M, I), a valuation function v, and a statistical for­
mula(), the relation 
((M, I), v) f= () 
is defined by augmenting the standard definition for 
first-order logic with the rule 
((M, I), v) f= [¢(v) 1 1/J(v)] k � p iff (vi) 
Jl( {(m1, ... , mk) E Mk I 
k k 
((M,I), v[rn I vi]) f= ¢(v) !\ 1/J(v)}) 
� p x ltk({(m1, ... ,mk) EM" I 
((M,I), v(� I .Ji]) F 1/J(v)}). 
Similarly, it will be required that for a probabilistic 
structure for a 
(M, I, Va) F prob(¢[a]l w[a]) � p 
only holds, if 
va( { (m1, ... , mn) E Mn I (M,I) F ¢[rn] !\ 1/J[rn)}) 
� p X Va({(ml,· . . ,mn) E Mn I (M,I) I= w[rnl}). 
However, this mere satisfaction of the constraints in ci>fi(a) is insufficient for va, as it does not establish any 
connection between the measures ltn and va. If the 
intuition is to be formalized, that lla should resemble 
ltn as much as possible within the limits drawn by 
ci>I'(a), then something more is required. 
First of all, the notion of "resemblance" has to be made 
precise. To this problem the following section is dedi­
cated. 
3.2 CROSS ENTROPY 
Cross entropy ([Kul59]) commonly is interpreted as a 
"measure of information dissimilarity" for two proba­
bility measures [Sho86]. Usually, cross entropy is used 
in a rule to update a prior estimate for the probability 
distribution of some variable to a posterior estimate 
when some new information about the variable's ac­
tual distribution has been obtained. However, both 
its information theoretic interpretation and its unique 
properties make cross entropy also the most promising 
tool for bridging the gap between general statistical 
knowledge and subjective beliefs. 
For a u-algebra 9J1 the set of probability measures on 
9J1 is denoted by .0.VJ7. Let J.l, v E .0.9J1 with v « /t, i.e. 
for every A E 9J1: �t(A) = 0 =? v(A) = 0. In this case 
there exists a density function f for 11 with respect to 
J.l, and the cross entropy of 11 with respect to It can be 
defined by 
CE(v, �t) = J jlnj dji,. 
If v '¢:. jt, define CE(v, �t) := oo. For J..t E .0.VJ7 and 
a closed (with regard to the variation distance 1 ) and 
1The variation distance of VJ, v2 E .C:..OOl is defined as the 
integral J I /J - h I dv where v E tl.9TI is such that 1.11 « 11 
and v2 « v (e.g. v == 1/2(vt + v2)), and f; is a density for 
v; with respect to v. 
convex subset N <;;; .0..9Jl, which contains at least one 11 
with CE(11, �t) < oo, there is a unique vo EN such that 
CE(vo,J..t) < CE(v, jt) for all11 E N, v # 11o [Csi75]. 
Denote this 11o by 1l'N (It). 
In the case that N is defined by a finite set of con­
straints 
{v(A;) � p x v(B;) I 
A;,B;EVJl, p;E[O,l], i=l, . . . ,k} 
the following theorem reduces the problem of comput­
ing 1l'N (J.l) to aCE-minimization on a finite probability 
space. 
For a subalgebra !JJl' <;;; VJl and J..t E .0.9JL the notation 
J..t I VJ7' is used for the restriction of J.l to VR'. N I VJ7' 
stands for { 11 I VJ7' I v E N}. 
Theorem 3.3 Let VJ70 be a finite subalgebra of 9J1 
generated by a partition {A11 ... , Ad � 9J1 of M. Let 
J..L E .0.9Jl, and N <;;; .0.9J1 be defined by a set of con­
straints on v:nG, i.e. for all 11 E ll!JJl: 
11EN ¢::> viVJ1°ENf!J.Jil. 
Then 1l'N (It) is defined iff 7l' N r 91!0 (It r !JJl0) is defined, and 
in this case for every C E VJl: 
k 
nN(J..t)(C) = L 7l'Nrmo(�ti9Jtl)(A;) �-t(C I A;). 
i=l 
The proof of this theorem is basically an application 
of property 9 from [SJ81]. 
Corollary 3.4 Let {A1, ... , Ad <;;; VJl be a partition 
of M, let N be defined by a set of constraints 
k 
{v(A;) = p; I i = l, . . . ,k}, L Pi = 1. 
i=l 
Then, for every probability measure J..L on 9J1 with 
p; > 0 =? p(A;) > 0 (i = 1, . . . , k), 7rN(P) is the prob­
ability measure obtained by applying Jeffrey's rule to 
It and the given constraints. 
Corollary 3.4 is a first indication that cross entropy 
might be the appropriate tool to model default reason­
ing about probabilities, and may serve as a preliminary 
justification for making cross entropy minimization the 
central element of the semantics for Ls u L�(a) now to 
be defined. 
3.3 THE FINAL SEMANTICS 
Definition 3.5 Let (M, I, va) be a probabilistic S­
structure for a, KB = cl>"" U ci>i3(a) a knowledge base. 
(M, I, va) is a model of KB iff 
• (M, I) f= �.,. as defined in section 3.1. 
• With Bel(a) the set of probability measures on 
VJln that satisfy the constraints in ci>fl(a): 
lla = 1l'Bel(a)(J..tn). 
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Bel(a) always is a closed (in the topology defined by 
the variation distance) and convex subset of .6.9Rn. To 
make sure that this will be the case is the reason for 
the restrictive syntax of L�(a). If it was allowed to 
express •prob(¢ I 1/J) � p for instance, then Bel(a) 
would need no longer be closed. Permitting disjunc­
tions prob( ... ) � p V prob( . . . ) � q destroys convex­
ity. Hence, by the remarks in section 3.2, there ex­
ists a measure lla satisfying the condition of definition 
3.5 iff Bel(a) contains at least one measure 11 with 
11 « Jl.n. When this is not the case, then the statisti­
cal S-structure (M, I) can not be extended to a model 
of KB. Should this be the case for all (M, I) f= 1>", 
then KB does not have a model. 
Note that Bel(a) is defined by constraints on the finite 
subalgebra of mn generated by the finitely many sub­
sets of Mn defined by the formulas appearing in cpf'(a). 
Hence, theorem 3.3 applies to 11'Bel(a)(?ln), and even though p, and va generally are probability measures on 
infinite probability spaces, cross entropy minimization 
only has to be performed on finite probability spaces. 
The logic defined by definitions 2.1 ,2.2 and 3.5 is de­
noted guf3. 
For a knowledge base KB and a sentence(} E LsUL�(aJ 
the relation KB f= B is defined as usual. 
gcri> is monotonic with respect to 1>", but non­
monotonic with respect to q>f'(a): if �"' 2 1>" and 
1>"" U q>i3(a) f= (}, then �"" U q>i3(a) f= (} for every 
(} E Ls u L�(aJ. If, on the other hand, �!3(a) 2 q,i3(a), 
then 1>"' u q>i3(a) F= e does not imply 1>" u <i>!3{a) F= (}_ 
4 WHY CROSS ENTROPY? 
Cross entropy minimization, in the past, has received a 
considerable amount of attention as a rule for updating 
probability measure. Notably, Shore and Johnson have 
provided an axiomatic description of minimum cross 
entropy updating [SJ80], [SJ83]. They show that, if a 
function f is used to define for a closed and convex set 
N of continuous or discrete probability measures and 
a prior p,: 
7r�(p,) := {v EN I f(v, p,) = inf{f(v', ,u) !11' E N}}, 
and the mapping (,u, N) 1--7 1r� (p,) satisfies a set of five 
axioms, then the function f must in fact be equivalent 
to cross entropy. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to also give an 
axiomatic justification for putting cross entropy min­
imization at the core of definition 3.5 by formulat­
ing a set of conditions that the consequence relation 
f= for guf3 should satisfy, and then show that only 
cross entropy minimization will fulfill these conditions. 
Instead, the two theorems contained in this section 
demonstrate that using cross entropy leads to very de­
sirable properties for .£"13, and indicate, when looked 
at as axioms rather than theorems, what an axiomatic 
justification for the use of cross entropy in the seman­
tics of .£"!3 would look like. 
The two theorems are directly derived from the two 
central axioms in [SJ80], subset independence and sys­
tem independence. The first one rephrases the prop­
erty of subset independence to a statement about log­
ical entailment in gcrf'. 
Theorem 4.1 Let ¢1(v), .. . ,(/Jk(v) E Ls. Let KB= 
1>"" U q>i3(a) with 
1>"' F Vv(¢1 (v)V ... v¢k(v)) 
(here v is the exclusive disjunction). Let 
q>P(a.) {prob (¢;[a]) �Pi I i = 1, .. . , k} 
U �Pf(a) U ... U I!>�( a)' 
where each I!>�( a) is of the form 
{prob(I/Jij[a]l ¢iJ[a]) � PiJ I j = 1, . . . , lk} 
for some ¢;J with q,u f= ¢ij -+ ¢;. Then, for every 
i E {1,,.,, k} and every subjective probability formula 
(}of the form prob(I/J[a]l¢i[a]) � p: 
1>"" U 1>�(a) f= B � KB F 0. 
By theorem 4.1, reasoning by cases is possible in .zcri3 
under certain circumstances: if �i3(a) contains subjec­
tive beliefs that are each conditioned on one of several 
mutually exclusive hypotheses for a, then valid infer­
ences about subjective beliefs conditioned on one of 
these hypotheses can be made by ignoring the infor­
mation about the other hypotheses. 
Example 4.2 The prospects for a happy ending of 
the mystery film we have been watching not being very 
bright, we switch to a different channel where another 
film is running. This one can be easily identified as an 
American production, but it could be either a romance 
or a mystery: 
prob(Americanf2 1\ Romancef2) 
prob(Americanf2 1\ Mystery f2) 
Also, we are ready to believe that 
prob(Happy_endf2 I 
0.5, (8) 
0.5. (9) 
Americanf2 1\ Romancef2) = 0.95 (10) 
Suppose we are interested in estimating 
prob(Happy_endf21 Americanf2/\ Mysteryf2). (*) 
Before we are able to apply the statistical rule (2) in 
order to obtain this estimate, we make the additional 
observation that should f2 be a mystery, then it is not 
particularly likely to contain action scenes, contrary to 
what we generally expect from mystery films: 
prob(Actionf21 Americanf2/\ Mysteryf2) = 0.5, (11) 
[Actionv I Americanv 1\ Mysteryv](v) = 0.7. (12) 
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This information is relevant for our estimate of ( * ) 
because the existence of action scenes is correlated to 
a happy end by 
[Actionv I 
Americanv 1\ Mysteryv 1\ -,Happy_endv](v) = 0.5. (13) 
Let KB /2 = �Movies u (bf3C
f2l consist of q,Movies from example 2.3 and the new sentences (8)-(13). KB 12 is 
of the form defined in theorem 4.1 with 
¢1(v) = Americanv 1\ Romancev, 
¢2(v) Americanv 1\ Mysteryv, and 
¢3(v) •(¢1 (v) V ¢2(v)). 
By theorem 4.1 we know that everything we can infer 
about ( * ) from the smaller knowledge base obtained 
by removing (8)-(10) from KB 12, also is valid with 
respect to KB 12. By elementary computations it can 
be seen that 
�Movies I= [Happy_endv I 
Americanv 1\ Mysteryv 1\ Actionv](u) = �, (14) 
.f.Movies F [Happy_endv I 
Americanv 1\ Mysteryv 1\ ...,Actionv](v) = �- (15) 
Hence, with theorem 3.3 
KB12 I= prob(Happy_endf21 Americanf2 1\ Mysteryf2) 
6 2 16 
= 0.5 X 7 + 0.5 X S = 21. (16) 
Also, combining (8)-(10) and (16) we get 
prob(Happy_endf2) 
16 
= 0.5 X 0.95 + 0.5 X 
21 
� 0.856. (17) 
The following theorem is derived from the system in­
dependence axiom. 
Theorem 4.3 Let KB= q,cr U q>f3(a), where 
q,f3(a) = q,f3(a.o, .. . ,a.k-d U .:pf3(a.h····a.,._,) 1 
i.e. the set of subjective probability formulas for 
a consists of two disjoint sets for (ao, ... ,ak-d and 
(ak, . . . , an-d· Suppose that 
q,cr U .:pf3(a.o, ... ,a.,_,) F 
prob(¢I[ao, . . . ,ak-d 11/Jdao, ... , ak-d) ;:::p1, (18) 
.:perU (bf3(ak,. .. ,an-d F 
prob(¢2[ak, ... ,an-I] I1/J2[ak, . . .  ,an-d) ;:::p2. (19) 
Then 
KB f= prob(¢I [ao ,  ... , ak-d 1\ ¢2[ak, . .. , an-d 
11/Jt[ao, . . . , ak-d 1\ 1/J2[ak,-.-, an-d) ;::: P1P2- (20) 
Theorem 4.3 remains true, when the inequality in (18)­
(20) is replaced with equality. 
Corollary 4.4 For KB as in the preceding theorem 
k 
and for every subjective belief formula B E L�(a): 
q,cr U .:pf3(ao,---,a.k-d F () ::::;.- KB F B. 
Roughly speaking, theorem 4.3 states, that when .:pi'( a) 
does not contain any information connecting one con­
stant a; with another constant aj, then these constants 
are interpreted as independent. Especially, ignoring 
the information about aJ still leads to valid inferences 
about a;. 
Example 4.5 Ultimately, we want to know which of 
the two films fl and f2 is likely to be the better one. 
Better is a predicate for which we have the axioms 
'livo•Bettervovo (21) 
'livovl( vo "I v1 � (Bettervov1 +-7 ·Betterv1 vo)) (22) 
and a useful statistic: 
[Bettervov1 I Happy_endvo 1\ •Happy_endvd(vo,vi) 
= 0.95. (23) 
Let KB fl/2 be the union of KB fl , KB 12 and the sen­
tences (21 )-(23). From (21 )-(23) 
[Bettervov1 I vo =I- Vt 1\ Happy _endvo 
/\Happy_endvd(vo,vi) = 0.5 (24) 
[Bettervov1 I vo "I v1 1\ •Happy_endvo 
f\-,Happy_endvl](vo,v,) 0.5 (25) 
[Bettervov1 I •Happy_endvo 
/\Happy_endvl](vo,v1) = 0.05 (26) 
can be derived by exploiting the fact that we are 
dealing with product measures, and therefore, for all 
p E [0 , 1] : 
f= [Bettervov1 I vo =I- v1 1\ Happy _endvo 
/\Happy_endvl](vo,vl) ;::: p 
+-7 [Betterv1 vo I vo =I- v1 1\ Happy _endvo 
/\Happy_endvt](vo,vl) ;::: p. 
By our previous results (1) (formally justified by corol­
lary 3.4) and (17), and theorem 4.3, the probabil­
ities of the conditioning events in (23)-(26) for f1 
and j2 are known to be 0.32 x (1 - 0.856) = 0.046, 
0.32 X 0.856 = 0.274, (1 - 0.32) X (1 - 0.856) = 0.098 
and (1 - 0.32) x 0.856 = 0.582 respectively. One fi­
nal application of Jeffrey's rule, sanctioned by theorem 
3.3, then yields 
KB flf2 f= prob(Better f1f2) = 
0.95 X 0.046 + 0.5 X 0.274 + 
0.5 X 0.098 + 0.05 X 0.582 = 0.259, 
which is a suitable result to settle the question about 
which film we are going to watch. 
Obviously, this example has been an extremely sim­
ple illustration of the given definitions and theorems 
throughout: neither will it be possible, in more real­
istic examples, to reduce cross entropy minimization 
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to an application of Jeffrey's rule, nor will the result­
ing probabilities usually be unique values rather than 
intervals. 
5 RELATED WORK 
In [PV89] and [PV92] Paris and Vencovska consider 
basically the same inference problem as is discussed 
in the present paper. They assume that two types 
of probabilistic constraints on expressions in proposi­
tional logic are given: one type referring to general pro­
portions, the other to subjective beliefs about an indi­
vidual. Their approach to dealing with the dichotomy 
of the probabilistic information is quite different from 
the one here presented: it is proposed to transform the 
constraints on the subjective beliefs about an object a 
to statistical constraints conditioned on a newly intro­
duced propositional variable A representing an ideal 
reference class for a, i.e. the set of all elements that are 
"similar to" a. Then an additional constraint is added 
that the absolute probability of this set is very small. 
Thus, all the constraints can be viewed as being on one 
single probability distribution. Paris and Vencovska 
then explore different inference processes that can be 
applied to these constraints in order to obtain a single 
probability distribution on the propositional formulas. 
Most notably, they consider the maximum entropy ap­
proach, and show that when it is used the resulting 
conditional probability distribution on the variable A 
is just the distribution on the formulas not containing 
A that minimizes cross entropy with respect to the 
global distribution on these formulas under the con­
straints for a (more precisely, this will be the case for 
the limiting distribution when the absolute probability 
of A tends to zero) . 
The techniques of probabilistic inference explored by 
Paris and Vencovska are quite different from the one 
discussed in this paper in that, as demanded by the 
uniform encoding of statistical and subjective prob­
abilities, one process of inference is applied to both 
kinds of information simultaneously. This makes Paris 
and Vencovska's paradigm for probabilistic inference a 
somewhat less likely framework for default reasoning 
about probabilities, where it is the key issue to give an 
interpretation of the subjective beliefs as a function of 
the interpretation of the statistical information. 
However, the mere semantic principle of interpreting 
subjective beliefs via conditional probabilities on a new 
reference class also allows for a separate processing of 
the constraints given for the domain in general and the 
constraints given with respect to the reference class. 
Thus, the two approaches of interpreting the subjec­
tive beliefs held about an object as either the condi­
tional distribution on a special reference class, or as 
an alternative measure on the domain as in .51af3, ba­
sically allow for the same scope of probabilistic rea­
soning. If it is intended, though, to clearly distinguish 
the reasoning about the statistics from the reasoning 
about beliefs - a separation pushed to the extreme in 
the probabilistic logics of Bacchus et al. and Halpern 
- the second approach probably will lead to greater 
conceptual clarity. 
6 CONCLUSION 
.51af3 is a logic that models the forming of subjective 
beliefs about objects on the basis of statistical infor­
mation about the domain and already existing beliefs. 
The novelty of the approach here presented lies in the 
idea of interpreting constant symbols as probability 
measures over the domain, which leads to semantics 
that seem to be better suited to describe the interac­
tion of statistical and belief probabilities than possible 
worlds semantics. In order to make effective use of 
cross entropy minimization, a fairly restrictive syntax 
with regard to expressing subjective beliefs was intro­
duced. 
It should be pointed out, though, that .51af3 is open 
to generalizations in various ways. Disjunctions and 
negations of subjective probability sentences might be 
allowed, in which case the condition Va = 'irBeL(a)(Jln) 
in definition 3.5 has to be replaced by the demand that 
va is one of the measures in the closure of Bel(a) that 
minimizes cross entropy with respect to Jl· 
Also, interpreting constant symbols as probability 
measures over the domain is a feasible way to inter­
pret formulas in which statements of subjective belief 
and statistical relations are arbitrarily nested, thus al­
lowing to express statements like 
[prob(Betterf1v);::: 0.9] (v) ;::: 0.2 
("for some (;::: 0.2) v it is believed that f1 is very 
likely (;::: 0.9) to be better than v). When formulas 
like these are allowed, however, it is more difficult to 
define what their proper default interpretation should 
be, because the interaction of statistical information 
and subjective beliefs can no longer be viewed as es­
sentially one-way only. 
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